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Conscious perception is not the result of passively processing sensory 
input, but to large extent of active infer-
ence based on previous knowledge. This 
process of inference does go astray from 
time to time, and may lead to illusory 
perception: sometimes people see things 
that are not there. In a recent study we 
have shown that this inference may also 
be influenced by mood. Here we pres-
ent some additional data, suggesting 
that illusory percepts are the result of 
increased top-down processing, which is 
normally helpful in detecting real stim-
uli. Finally, we speculate on a possible 
function of mood-dependent modulation 
of this top-down processing in social per-
ception in particular.
It is tempting to think of our visual sys-
tem as a sort of biological video camera, 
projecting images via the retina onto our 
mind’s eye. This view, however, is clearly 
oversimplified. Already in the 17th century, 
now legendary theorists like Descartes, 
Molyneux, and Berkeley postulated the 
idea that ‘seeing’ is not a function of the 
eyes, but of ‘of the soul’ (reviewed in 
ref. 1). It is quite clear nowadays that what 
we see is not just a function of ‘what is 
out there’, but to significant degree influ-
enced by what is going on in our minds. 
Helmholtz already proposed in the late 
19th that vision is an active process, and 
largely guided by what we already know 
about the world.2
In the past decade, Helmholtz’s idea has 
seen an enormous boom in theoretical and 
empirical support in the literature. There 
is growing consensus that the brain does 
not passively process the input it receives 
from the eyes in order to provide us with a 
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visual representation of our environment, 
but instead continuously generates predic-
tions about what the world should look 
like. These predictions, based on both 
memory and expectancy, are subsequently 
matched with actual visual input. What 
we are conscious of, is the result of this 
matching process.3-5 The computational 
benefits of such a strategy are clear: accu-
rate predictions remove a large portion of 
redundancy from incoming sensory sig-
nals.6 Although the exact neural mecha-
nisms of this predictive process remain 
somewhat elusive, it is clear that so-called 
top-down interactions between higher 
cortical areas, such as the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and lower-tier visual areas, pos-
sibly including the primary visual cortex 
(V1), play an important role in matching 
predictions with ‘what is out there’.3,7
Top-down modulation of visual pro-
cessing does obviously affect perception. 
Expecting a stimulus or being familiar 
with it lowers detection thresholds, alters 
its color appearance, and decreases latency 
of conscious perception.8-10 However, 
there is ample evidence that the effects of 
prediction based modulation of visual pro-
cessing stretch even further: sometimes, 
expecting a stimulus makes us see one 
while in fact nothing has been presented 
at all. Though not completely uncontro-
versial, there is good evidence that such 
illusory percepts, too, are the result of top-
down modulation of activity in the early 
visual areas.11-14
Logically, predictive coding models of 
vision assume that the brain’s predictions 
are purely generated on basis of ‘factual 
knowledge’ and statistical inference.4 This 
assumption, however, may be too limited. 
In a recent study we have demonstrated 
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a face, irrespective of one was presented 
or not, we subtracted the ‘correct reject’ 
activity from the ‘hit’ and ‘false alarm’ 
activity. For statistical analyses, we com-
puted the average activity in the interval 
from 200–300 ms post stimulus for the 
two subtraction potentials (hit-correct 
reject and false alarm-correct reject) in 
channels O1, O2 and Oz. Activity in 
this time window in posterior electrodes 
has been demonstrated to correlate with 
higher level vision, perceptual integration 
and visual awareness.16
In line with our earlier work,15 partici-
pants had a false alarm rate of 22% (SD 
17%), and a hit rate of 84% (SD 11%). Of 
all hits, 91% was correctly identified (SD 
6%). The evoked potential results show 
a robust negativity in the posterior elec-
trodes 200–300 ms after stimulus onset 
for hits vs. correct rejects (t
12
 = -4.00, p 
= 0.001, one-tailed). False alarms, how-
ever, were also associated by a significant 
negativity in the occipital electrodes in the 
same time window (t
12
 = -1.78, p = 0.050, 
one-tailed) (Fig. 2). Interestingly, overall 
detection and identification performance 
were also related to mean VEP amplitude 
for false alarms: higher performance was 
related to more negative amplitudes (rho = 
-0.62, p = 0.012 and rho = -0.50, p = 0.039 
respectively).
These results confirm that ‘seeing what 
is not there’ is associated with perceptual-
like processing. Moreover, since illusory 
perception is believed to reflect ‘pure 
top-down’ processing,12 the correlation 
informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. All participants had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, and 
reported no neurological or psychiatric 
problems. This study was approved by 
local Ethics Committee and conducted 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Visual stimulation was identical to.15 For a 
schematic representation of a typical trial, 
see Figure 1.
EEG was recorded using a 32 channel 
Refa EEG system (TMSi BV, Enschede, 
The Netherlands), with electrodes posi-
tioned according to the 10/20 system. 
Horizontal and vertical EOG was mea-
sured to control for eyeblinks. The EEG 
signal was digitized and sampled at 500 
Hz on a separate acquisition computer. 
Markers, synchronized with cue onset, 
were sent with the EEG signal by the 
stimulation computer to allow for offline 
segmentation. EEG data was analyzed 
using Analyzer (Brain Vision Products 
GmbH, Germany). The raw signal was 
filtered between 0.5 Hz and 15 Hz, and 
subsequently corrected for eye movement 
artifacts. The signal was then segmented 
into 2,500 ms epochs (1,000 ms pre- and 
1,500 ms post cue). Epochs were first 
baseline-corrected (100 ms baseline), 
and then checked for artifacts. Segments 
in which the maximum absolute ampli-
tude exceeded 200 uV were excluded 
from analysis. Evoked potentials were 
computed for hits, misses, correct rejects 
and false alarms. In order to assess neural 
activity evoked exclusively by perceiving 
that expectancy-induced illusory percepts 
are strongly modulated by mood. In a 
challenging face detection task, observers 
had to detect happy and sad faces embed-
ded in noise. In a significant number of 
trials in which no face was presented, 
observers did report a face. Critically, 
their responses were strongly affected by 
mood. We manipulated mood of observ-
ers by having them listen to music that 
made them happy or sad. We found that 
observers were more likely to report illu-
sory happy faces when they were listen-
ing to happy music, and vice versa when 
listening to sad music. The ratio of real 
happy vs. sad faces was the same for these 
conditions, however. Therefore, according 
to strictly expectancy-driven models of 
predictive coding in vision, mood should 
not have had an effect. Still, we found that 
the brain’s top-down predictions were ‘col-
ored’ by the observers’ mood.15
While the computational benefits of 
using statistical inference in visual pro-
cessing may be clear, the functional signif-
icance of mood-dependent modulations 
of visual processing is less so. Here, we 
present some additional electrophysiologi-
cal data to our recently published work. 
Moreover, we discuss some recent litera-
ture that may shed some light on the ques-
tion why and how the brain reflects mood 
in conscious visual perception.
Participants (n = 13, 6 males, mean 
age 20.3 y) were first year students of 
the bachelor program in Psychology of 
the University of Groningen. Written 
Figure 1.  a schematic representation of a typical trial.
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is activated (a happy or a sad face, for 
example). This results in the observed 
increased sensitivity toward stimuli that 
are mood-congruent.15 We propose that 
this mechanism may serve to fine-tune 
social interactions, and matching our 
behavior with the emotions of others: 
when we are in a happy state of mind, our 
approach of someone who is sad or angry 
will be different than when we ourselves 
are in a bad mood as well.
Interestingly, there is some clinical lit-
erature backing up this hypothesis. First, 
in mood disorders, such as depression, 
facial recognition is impaired: there is an 
overall bias to interpret facial expressions 
as overly negative. In other words, neutral 
faces appear to be sad, for example.20 We 
theorize that this may be the result of an 
over-activation of the visual schema for 
negative facial expression, which subse-
quently leads to a (mild) distortion in per-
ception of facial expressions.
Another disorder in which there seems 
to be a link between top-down process-
ing and impairment in face processing is 
autism. Recent studies have linked autism 
to anomalies in feedback or top-down 
processing.2 Interestingly, in particular 
negativities correspond with better detec-
tion and identification performance. 
Because false alarm-evoked negativity 
may be considered to reflect ‘pure’ top-
down processing,12 this correlation hints 
at the possibility that increased top-down 
processing aids in processing of real 
stimuli, at the expense of triggering false 
alarms.
As stated in the introduction, the exact 
neural mechanisms of matching percep-
tual input with top-down predictions 
remain elusive. We may assume, though, 
that the presumed top-down predic-
tions may be equated with activation of 
rough visual schemata or stereotypes.3,17 
Recent studies using a reverse correlation 
approach have provided support for the 
idea that such visual stereotypes indeed 
may exist for facial features, including 
emotional expressions.17-19 The data we 
present here suggests that when detecting 
faces in noise, activation of such sche-
mata based on prediction (or, in other 
words, top-down processing) results in 
superior detection of stimuli, at the cost 
of an occasional false alarm.
However, our earlier work shows that 
the observer’s mood affects which schema 
between illusion-evoked negativity and 
performance on detection of real stimuli 
suggests that top-down processing aids in 
perception of real stimuli.
People sometimes see things that are 
not there, an effect attributed to the fact 
that sometimes the brain’s top-down 
interpretation of perceptual input takes 
over the actual percept. Here, we present 
some additional data to our recent work 
on mood congruency effects in top-down 
processing of visual stimuli: we show 
that illusory perception of schematic 
faces is associated with a negative evoked 
potential 200–300 ms after participants 
were cued a face could appear. Activity 
in this time window is believed to reflect 
feedback processing from higher cortical 
areas back to early visual areas, playing 
an important role in perceptual inter-
pretation and integration of information 
into a coherent conscious percept, and in 
matching the brain’s top-down predic-
tions with actual perceptual input.5-7,16
A striking observation in our data are 
the correlation between amplitude of 
visual evoked potentials in response to 
a false alarm, and accuracy in detection 
and identification of real stimuli. Larger 
Figure 2. False alarms associated by a significant negativity in the occipital electrodes in the same time window (t12 = -1.78, p = 0.050, one-tailed).
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20. Demenescu LR, Kortekaas R, Den Boer JA, Aleman 
A. Impaired attribution of emotion to facial expres-
sions in anxiety and major depression. PLoS ONE 
2010; 5:15058; PMID:21152015; DOI:10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0015058.
21. Vandenbroucke MW, Scholte HS, Van Engeland H, 
Lamme VA, Kemner C. A new approach to the study 
of detail perception in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD): investigating feedforward, horizontal and 
feedback processing. Vision Res 2009; 49:1006-16; 
PMID:18267323; DOI:10.1016/j.visres.2007.12.017.
22. Loth E, Gómez JC, Happé F. When seeing 
depends on knowing: adults with Autism Spectrum 
Conditions show diminished top-down processes 
in the visual perception of degraded faces but not 
degraded objects. Neuropsychologia 2010; 48:1227-
36; PMID:20026140; DOI:10.1016/j.neuropsycho-
logia.2009.12.023.
23. Jolij J. From affective blindsight to affective blind-
ness: when cortical processing suppresses subcortical 
information. In: Columbus F (Ed). Neural Pathways. 
New York: Nova Science Publishers 2008.
24. Jolij J, Lamme VAF. Repression of unconscious 
information by conscious processing: evidence from 
transcranial magnetic stimulation-induced blind-
sight. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2005; 102:10747-51; 
PMID:16030150; DOI:10.1073/pnas.0500834102.
25. Jehee JF, Roelfsema PR, Deco G, Murre JM, 
Lamme VA. Interactions between higher and lower 
visual areas improve shape selectivity of higher 
level neurons—explaining crowding phenomena. 
Brain Res 2007; 1157:167-76; PMID:17540349; 
DOI:10.1016/j.brainres.2007.03.090.
26. Lamme VA. Why visual attention and aware-
ness are different. Trends Cogn Sci 2003; 7:12-
8; PMID:12517353; DOI:10.1016/S1364-
6613(02)00013-X.
27. Baumeister RF, Masicampo EJ. Conscious thought is 
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Psychol Rev 2010; 117:945-71; PMID:20658859; 
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integrating non-sensory elements within 
a conscious sensory representation would 
allow for quicker decision making in 
socio-cultural interactions.16
Summarizing, our work thus far shows 
that people sometimes see things that 
aren’t there. These illusory percepts are a 
‘side-effect’ of top-down modulation of 
visual processing, and may signal to some 
extent the observer’s present affective state. 
We hypothesize that this mood-dependent 
modulation of conscious perception may 
be particularly useful in guiding social 
interactions.
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top-down processing of faces seems to be 
impaired.21,22 Although speculative, it is 
well possible be that this impairment also 
interferes with matching face processing 
with one’s own emotional state, leading to 
social-cognitive impairments.
Interestingly, in earlier work on uncon-
scious processing of visual information, 
we already proposed that complex behav-
ior, in particular social behavior, may be 
predominantly guided by conscious visual 
representations. Facial expressions, for 
example, can be recognized very rapidly, 
in absence of visual awareness, within 
an unconscious face processing network. 
This network, including the amygdala 
is believed to play a critical role in guid-
ing social-affective behavior.23 However, 
although this processing within this 
network maybe fast and independent of 
awareness, it is also quite crude: we have 
shown, for example, that the unconscious 
recognition of emotional expressions tops 
of at about 70% in a two-alternative forced 
choice task, whereas conscious recognition 
is nearly perfect.24 This superior accuracy 
of conscious visual processing most likely 
stems from the larger capacity for incorpo-
rating spatial detail.25
Given the importance of accurate emo-
tion recognition in social interaction, we 
have proposed that the brain may pri-
oritize consciously processed information 
over unconscious information in non-
reflexive decision making—a finding we 
corroborated in a recent electrophysiologi-
cal study on texture discrimination.16 The 
work presented here suggests an additional 
benefit of recurrent, and thus conscious,26 
visual processing: the widespread interac-
tions within the visual processing network 
allow for the integration of non-sensory 
information in sensory representations. 
Such a view fits well with a recently pro-
posed theory by Marciano and Baumeister, 
who speculate that consciousness serves a 
special function in facilitating socio-cul-
tural interaction. In particular, they state 
that consciousness serves to assign mean-
ing and narrative to external events.27 
Although this theory primarily applies 
to conscious thought and not perception, 
